Following the recent announcement that Australia would acquire three submarines already in US service rather than two used submarines and one new one, AUKUS has again dominated headlines. AUKUS is a defence capability agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Since it was announced in 2021, it's rarely been out of the news.
Following the recent announcement that Australia would acquire three submarines already in US service rather than two used submarines and one new one, AUKUS has again dominated headlines.
AUKUS is a defence capability agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Since it was announced in 2021, it's rarely been out of the news.
But how much of what you have heard is true?
As a former Navy officer specialising in anti-submarine warfare, I am frequently asked the same questions about AUKUS. While I can't address everything in one article, here are the details behind some of the most common claims.
Australia has Collins class submarines that entered service between 1996 and 2003. Work should already be underway to replace them, but decades of delays and underfunding have left us with an ageing fleet.
Though the Collins class submarines will each go through a multi-year maintenance period extending their life, they won't last long enough. They will need to be decommissioned before Australia can co-design, build and produce submarines here under AUKUS.
A stopgap solution is required. The purchase of three Virginia class submarines in 2032, 2035 and 2038 will provide this, and also give Australia the ability to start operating nuclear-powered submarines.
Think of it as a "crawl, walk, run" approach. The Virginias are the walk phase before we start building our own nuclear-powered submarines.
Acquiring submarines already in service reduces risk and complexity, avoids the challenges of introducing a new submarine, and removes the need for initial certification trials.
Not in any meaningful sense, though the third Virginia will be an older version than planned, so its sensors will probably be slightly less capable.
Australia will now receive three Block IV Virginia class submarines. These remain among the most capable attack submarines in the world. They carry more than 20 torpedoes and 12 Tomahawk land strike missiles.
Much of the commentary this week has suggested Australia has lost additional missile capacity because the submarines we're receiving won't have the "Virginia Payload Module" - a new hull section that allows the submarines to carry more missiles.
But that commentary is incorrect.
The submarine Australia was expected to receive in 2038 was never intended to have that capability.
In conflict, Australia would predominantly use these submarines in an anti-submarine and anti-ship role. Land strike missiles are not used for this and so the extra capacity isn't essential. It's also capability the US has said it is not willing to provide.
The main difference is the third submarine will have fewer years of life remaining than a new boat. A Virginia class submarine off the production line would normally have a 33-year life.
At Senate estimates this week, the Australian Submarine Agency said each boat will have more than 20 years of life remaining when we receive them.
Claims these submarines would only have eight years of life do not withstand scrutiny. The kind of submarines Australia will receive only started entering service in 2020.
The figure most often quoted for AUKUS is $368 billion. While technically correct, this figure covers costs through to 2055 including infrastructure, workforce and maintenance costs over 31 years, plus the purchase of Virginia class submarines to Australia and building our own submarines.
Of the total, about $244 billion is the projected cost, while the remaining $122.9 billion is a 50% contingency on top. This is money set aside to cover risks, cost growth and unforeseen problems. Most defence projects carry 5-10% contingency.
The Department of Defence's 2026 Integrated Investment Program states nuclear-powered submarines will cost between $71 billion and $96 billion over the next decade.
Against projected defence funding of about $887 billion over the same period, this equates to around 8-11% of defence spending.
This is one of the most legitimate points of debate in the discussion.
The US reduced its production rate of submarines after the Cold War. Since 2011 it has set a goal of increasing its build rate to two submarines a year. From 2016-19 it averaged 1.9 boats a year.
According to the US Congressional Research report on Virginia class submarines, this build rate dropped off due to workforce issues during COVID and challenges associated with moving to the build of the new Block V submarine, which is 2,000 tonnes larger than the Block IV Virginia. The US is investing billions of dollars into its submarine industrial base to address this issue.
In May, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle told Congress he expects Virginia production to reach two boats per year in around 2032. He previously said the US will need to get to a 2.3 production rate to get to its 2054 goal, including the sale of three Virginias to Australia. The US is presently building 1.3 a year.
The US submarine industrial base challenges are real, and will take significant effort to address. Has the US said it will not sell submarines to Australia if it doesn't get there? No.
Yes.
AUKUS is the most complex defence project in Australian history. There are risks in the US and UK industrial bases, workforce growth, infrastructure and funding. Anyone claiming otherwise is not engaging with reality.
But much has been achieved in less than five years.
Australia has established a submarine base near Perth, embedded personnel in US and UK submarine programs, commenced major infrastructure works, trained hundreds of personnel, and secured US congressional approval for the submarine transfers.
At the recent AUKUS Defence Ministers' Meeting, all three countries stated the program remained on track. Based on the evidence available today, I agree.
This is a multi-decade program. There will be changes along the way. Not every adjustment is evidence of failure.
Australia cannot simply walk away from AUKUS and pick another submarine off the shelf. Any alternative would require a new acquisition process, a new agreement and years of negotiation.
There is also no obvious replacement. France's nuclear-powered submarines, for example, are built through a single shipyard and can take more than a decade to complete.
If Australia was to abandon a second submarine program in little more than a decade, this time with our closest ally, it would be hard to imagine another country lining up to partner with Australia on a future submarine project. After cancelling the French submarine program and significantly reducing other naval programs, our reputation for delivering in this area is already under pressure.
AUKUS should continue to be scrutinised. But that scrutiny should be anchored in facts. Any proposal to abandon it must also explain what replaces it and how Australia avoids a submarine capability gap.
Having spoken with officials in our partner nations, the concern raised most often is not the US or UK industrial base. It is Australian political will. As a nation, we should be mindful of that and measured in our debate.
TheConversation.com
Author: Jennifer Parker - Adjunct Professor, Defence and Security Institute, The University of Western Australia; UNSW Sydney
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